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THE McCOLLUTH DECISION AND TIE PUBLIC SCHOOL
The recent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the
case of People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Vasht McCollum v
Board of Education of School D?strict No. 71 Champaignz County,
Illivnois, 1 bids fair to disrupt the efforts to provide any sort of
religious training in connection with the public schools of the
nation, by compelling modification, if not complete discontinuance, of the practice. Although the efforts of various religious
sects to utilize the public school systems for the furtherance of
their doctrines has taken different forms, the practice of providing some sort of religious instruction for school children is
or has been practically universal. 2 The particular plan -under
consideration in the principal case was a "released time" arrangement entered into by a local board of education in Illinois
and an organization known as the Champaign Council on Religious Education which was composed of representatives of the
various faiths-Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. Teachers were
employed by this group to give instruction in religion for one
period each week. For this period of religious education, pupils
were grouped according to their faith, as indicated by their
parents on request cards furnished by the Council and distributed by the teachers. Attendance records were kept and reported to the regular school authorities, those not attending continned their regular school work. The case arose by way of a
petition for mandamus to compel the Board of Education to
adopt rules and regulations prohibiting religious instruction in
the public schools. The Supreme Court held the Champaign plan
to be unconstitutional as a violation of the concept of separation
of Church and State as enunciated by the First Amendment and
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.-'
The holding indicates that the Court impliedly, but necessarily,
1333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 451 (1948).

See GORHAM, A STUDY OF THE STATUS OF WEEKDAY CHURCH
stating that weekday reSCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1934)
ligious instruction is being given in at least 41 states. Also, The Public and Education, published by the National Education Association,
Vol. 3, No. 3 (May 25, 1948), stating that 2,000,000 out of 25,000,000
children in the public schools are involved in released-time classes.
3Cantwell v State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900,
84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).
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found that the practice amounted to a law "respecting an establishment of religion." 4 The mandate of the Court was generally
to sustain plaintiff's complaint, which was to order the defendant
to "
adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all
instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public
schools
and in all public school houses and buildings ii said
district when occupied by public schools."5
The controversy surrounding the question is well illustrated
by the unusual number of briefs filed with the Court on behalf
of various religious organizations, as antim curiae.6 The decision
has been much debated and widely discussed and its reception
has ranged from an attitude of jubilation to outright hostility
But even without attempting to discuss-and evaluate either the
merits or the shortcomings of the "released time" plans of religious instruction in the public schools, and hence the soundness or absurdity of the results which are prompted b the decision, an interesting diversion is provided by attempting to
define the scope of the decision and its probable effect on "released time" or other types of plans which vary in details from
the Champaign plan. And further, to what extent, if at all, may
the reasoning of the court be used to invalidate practices other
than "released time" programs which have, up until this time,
been sheltered from the operation of the First Amendment under
the guise of moral instruction which does not partake of a sec
tarian or denominational character 7
Inasmuch as "released time" programs vary in their
methods of operation, a question naturally presented is whether
all such plans are thus invalid even though they might have
features which differ radically from the particular plan which
was before the Court. The official opinion seems to single out at
least three aspects of the Champaign plan which it considered
to be objectionable These are summed up in the statements
"The foregoing facts
show the use of taxsupported property for religious instruction and the close
cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education. The
operation of the state's compulsory education system thus
4

U. S. CONST. AMEND. I.

McColium v Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 234, 68 Sup. Ct.
461, 476, 92 L.Ed. 451, 468 (1948)
"Id. at 228, n. 19, 68 Sup. Ct. at 473, n. 19, 92 L.Ed. at 465 n. 19.
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assists and is integrated with the program of religious
in7
struction carried on by separate religious sects.
Hence, the objectionable features were

public property for religious education,

(1)

the use of

(2) the compulsory

education law which made the children available, and (3) the
cooperation between the civil and religious authorities. Assuming this to be a correct evaluation of the opinion, the further
question presented is whether the presence of any one of these
objectionable features in a "released time" plan would invalidate
the entire plan where the other features were not incorporated.
This appears to be the gist of one of the objections voiced in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson where it was said
"While I agree that the religious classes involved here go beyond permissible limits, I also think the
complaint demands more than plaintiff is entitled to have
granted. So far as I can see this Court does not tell the
State court where it may stop, nor does it set up any
standards by which the State court may determine that
question for itself."' s

On the other hand there is the definite indication by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion that there might
be certain types of "released time" programs which would be
unobjectionable.

It was said.

"Different forms which 'released time' has
taken during more than thirty years of growth include
programs which, like that before us, could not withstand
the test of the Constitution; others may be found unexceptionable. We do not now attempt to weigh in the Constitutional scale every separate detail or various combination of factors which may establish a valid 'released
time' program."'
If this remark is to be relied upon, there is the stroig indication that the presence of any ove of the objectionable features
would not be sufficient to invalidate all such plans.

That the

phrase, "released time", was used in a particular sense in the
above quotation, and not intended to have had a parallel meaning with a "dismissed time" type plan,i ° is indicated by the
Id. at 209, 68 Sup. Ct. at 464, 92 L.Ed. at 455.
Id. at 237, 68 Sup. Ct. at 478, 92 L.Ed. at 469.
'Id. at 231, 68 Sup. Ct. at 475, 92 L.Ed. at 466.
"1 A plan originated by the French whereby all the school children are dismissed from the jurisdiction of the school officials, per
mitting those who so desire to attend a religious school.
a
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fact that in the same opinion there was a separate discussion of
the latter type plan."i
Agaist this background, the application of the principles
of the decision to a particular situation is understandably difficult, if not well-nigh impossible. Many questions must necessarilv go unanswered until future cases are presented to and
answered by the Court. But until those cases are tested against
the constitutional prohibition, what of the practices which are
now prevalent in our school systems9
Some effort has been made bv the writer to ascertain the
extent of religious instruction in the public schools of Kentucky
with particular emphasis upon the use of the varying types of
"released time" plans. Some information as to the general problem has been furnished by the Department of Education of the.
Conmmonwealth of Kentucky It was learned that the Superintendent of Public Instruction had appointed a Committee on
M1oral and Spiritual Education and questionnaires were addressed to 246 local school superintendents throughout the State,
requesting, among other things, that a report be made as to
whether a "released time" program was being used in their
local school system. A comparatively small number answered
the questionnaires, but if the practices in the school systems of
those replying may be taken as representative of all the school
systems, the extent of the "released time" practice is immediately evident. Questionnaires returned to the Superintendent
showed that approximately 28% were relying on the "released
time" program, in one form or another, to provide moral and
spiritual education. Almost all the others were attempting to
integrate this instruction into their general school programs
through other methods.
"Released time" plans throughout the country vary in their
details, but generally they can be broken down into three distinct types 12
1. Where the school releases the pupils from regular class
work and also provides housing and other facilities for the re
ligmous education classes. This is the Champaign plan held uii" McCollum v Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 230, 68 Sup. Ct.
461, 474-475, 92 L.Ed. 451, 466 (1948).
2 37 NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
1948).
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constitutional in the principal case. This type of plan was found
to be present in the Kentucky schools, with the modification, in
at least one school system, that the religious council conducting
the instruction rented the school room from the Board of Education.
2. Where students are released from their regular classroom work to attend religious education classes conducted away
from the school property, but are required to attend the classes
by virtue of the keeping of attendance records which are checked
against their regular school attendance, plus other influences bv
the civil officials to encourage participation in the religious
training. The language of the decision is sufficiently broad to
bring such a plan within the prohibited category, because students are made available by the compulsory school law and there
is present in the plan the prohibited cooperation between civil
and religious officials.
3. Where the above plan (No. 2) is carried out with no
cooperation from civil officials other than the releasing of children to attend the religious education instruction, the children
remaining under the technical jurisdiction of the school. There
is evidence in the decision to indicate that even this type of
program would be objectionable, although it would seem that
this is approaching the limits of the decision. It is believed that
the statutory authority for the release of Kentucky school childdren to obtain "moral instruction" falls within this category
Ky. R. S. sec. 158.220 (1948) provides as follows
'The boards of education shall fix one day
each week when pupils who have expressed a desire for
moral instruction may be excused for at least one hour to
attend their respective places of worship or some other
suitable place to receive moral instruction in accordance
with the religious faith or preference of the pupils."
The above statute standing alone might become a basis for
a valid "dismissed time" plan, discussed znfra. However, the
statute must be read in connection with Ky. R. S. see. 158.240
(1948) which provides that pupils attending such moral iistruction classes are to be credited with the time spent as if they
had been in actual attendance in school. By the provisions of
Ky. R. S. see. 158.250 (1948) pupils not attending the moral
instruction are to remain in school "
but shall not receive any
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educational advantage over children receiving the moral instrue
ton." Because of the statutory authority it is natural to suppose that this type of "released time" program has been utilized
in the Kentucky schools more than the other types of programs
outlined above.
In addition to the above plans there are organized programs

where children voluntarily attend religious instruction classes
away from school property, and the participants are dismissed
entirely from the school's jurisdiction by authority of state law
which authorizes school boards to dismiss school early Such
programs are known to religious education groups as "dismissed
time", and it appears that they would not be objectionable under
the decision in the principal case. It should be noted, however,
that the Kentucky statutes discussed above cannot become a basis
for such a plan, inasmuch as the statutes, considered as a uit,
do not permit that complete release of the students from the
school's .jurmsdiction which is the basis of a true dismissed tme
plan.
Controversial as the decision promises to be in its effect
upon the various types of "released time" plans, it promises to
be even more controversial when its implications are applied to
some of the other traditional practices employed ii many school
systems in an attempt to provide moral instruction. Perhaps the
most common, as well as controversial, of such practices is the
reading of the Bible and repeating the Lord's Prayer, which is
ordinarily done during opening exercises of the school. In Kentuckv,' :- as in some other states,14 the teachers in public schools
are required by statute to read or cause to be read daily a por
tion of the Bible in the presence of the students, with the qualification in the Kentucky statute that "no child shall be required
"Ky. R. S. sec. 158.170 (1948)
"Keesecker, Legal Status of Bible Reading and Religious In-

struction in Public Schools, U.S. Office of Education Bulletin No. 14,
4-5 (1930), stating that twelve states have statutes requiring Bible

reading; six states have statutes specifically permitting the practice;
twenty states impliedly permit it by the general terms of the law or
by reason of its silence on the subject. The practice has been pro-

hibited, either by assumption or by decision of the state's highest
court, in only twelve jurisdictions.
JOHNSON AND

UNITED STATES, c.

YOST,

SEPARATION

OF CHURCH AND

this general situation. up to the present time.
L.3.-5

STATE

IN

THE

4 (1948), indicates there has been little change in
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to read the Bible against the wish of his parents or guardian."l5
Failure to comply with the requirements of the statute is a cause
for revocation of the teacher's certificate. 1 This statute stands
alongside another providing that no book or other publication
of a sectarian character shall be used nor any sectarian doctrine
be taught in any common school. 17 As to the question of whether
the Bible is a sectarian book within the meaning of these statutory prohibitions, the courts are not in accord.is It has been
suggested that many of the cases which appear to be in conflict
are distinguishable in that the facts of some cases show that
the Bible-reading merely emphasized fundamental morality,
while in other cases the reading and comments thereon did in
fact amount to religious instruction." Assuming this to be a
rational distinction where various sects or denominations of the
Christian religion are concerned, what of the rights of nonChristians as set forth by the decision under discussion 2 Clearly
the decision does not directly affect the practice of Bible-reading.
It appears from the general tenor of the decision that the court
had in mind sectarian religious instruction, 20 although the suit
was at the instance of an avowed atheist who supposedly h.as no
more interest in one sect than another. Would not this same
atheist have as much right to compel the discontinuance of any
religious instruction, sectarian or non-sectarian, or religious influence of any kind in the public schools 9 -Mr. Justice Jackson
noted in his concurring opinion that the complainant had objected to the use of the Bible and the Lord's Prayer, and lie felt
that the court by generally ordering that plaintiff's petition be
sustained, accepted the complaint in these details as well as in
2
the specific application to the "released time" plan. i If such
be the intent of the decision to be adhered to in future cases, it
appears that the required reading of the Bible and the practice
of repeating the Lord's Prayer is, or might well be, objectionable
to the First Amendment as being a law respecting the establishment of religion, without regard to whether such practices are
15Ky.R. S. sec. 158.170 (1948)
'"Ky. R.S. sec. 158.990(4) (1948)
'T7 Ky. R. S. sec. 158.190 (1948)
See Notes,'5 A.L.R. 866 (1920) 141 A.L.R. 1144 (1942).
47 Am. JUR., Schools, 448.
-' McCollum v Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 226, 68 Sup. Ct.
461, 473, 92 L.Ed. 451, 464 (1948).
Id. at 235, 68 Sup. Ct. at 477, 92 L.Ed. at 468.
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sectarian within the meaning of the several states' constitutions.
It is, therefore, possible that the materials which can be
legitimately employed in the future for the inculcation of
morality are likely to be greatly limited. Presumably the indoctrination of pupils with moral and ethical principles remains
a permissible function of the public school, but conceivably the
teaching that there are future penalties or rewards for adherence or non-adherence to those principles cannot be a part of
that teaching. Would this result be an adoption of a form of
Humanism as the "official" religion of the United States9
While delving into the possibilities created by the decision,
it is arguable that some of these borderline religious influences
which are present in the school systems and not specifically outlawed by the decision may be reconciled with it on the basis of
their being "cultural" education. One concurring opinion expressly provides for such an exception from the general prohibition.2 2 Lack of comment on the part of the other majority opinions may or may not be significant. But the exception is limited
to the secular study of religious literature, painting, and music
and tins Is permitted only up to that point where it begins to.
serve to disseminate religious doctrines. In particular there
would seem to be no basis for the belief that such an exception
would validate Sectarian influences, such as religious garb for
teachers, wlnch would seem to offer little in the way of cultural
value. 23
The further, but related, problem is whether school authorities may permit school buildings to be used for religious education when not in use for secular activities. The cases are in
conflict as to what semi-religious school activities will transform
a public school building into a place of worship in violation of
Id.

Some state statutes prohibit the hiring of garbed teachers in
the public schools. A public school administrator may discriminate
or not in the hiring of such teachers and the taxpayer cannot object
in the absence of such legislation. But if the teacher wears religious
garb in the school against the order of the administrator, her pay
may validly be withheld. See,, JOHNSON and YOST, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, C. 8 (1948).
Recently North Dakota enacted "anti-garb" legislation prohibiting any public school teacher from wearing -clothing denoting membership in a religious order. As a consequence, Catholic nuns were
given ecclesiastical permission to wear secular dress while teaching
in the public schools.
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state constitutions prohibiting expenditure of public moneys in
support of places of worship. 24 Such use of public buildings
might be justified under the theory that the state should be
neutral rather than hostile toward religion. 2 5 This reasomng
may have become obsolete in the face of the prohibition in the
principal case against the use of tax-supported property for seatarian education. 2 6 In view of this broad prohibition, a pertinent
inquiry might then be whether state colleges and universities are
justified in gratuitously providing facilities on state property for
organizations such as the YMCA, or certainly for purely sectarian student organizations. On the other hand if a fair and
compensatory rental is paid by a sectarian organization for the
use of public school property for purely religious purposes (e. g.,
rental of the school assembly hall for Sunday church services)
it is clear that no economic burden is imposed on the taxpayer.
It might be questioned whether such rental does not violate the
First Amendment nonetheless on the basis of the principal case
as a breach in the "wall of separation" Perhaps, however, the
principal case depends on the union of compulsory elements with
use of school property If this is so, then a true "dismissed time"
plan, employing rented school property, might still be valid.
Another question might be raised as to the validity of credits for
courses in religion and Bible. Although no public school may
award them, they are commonly accepted on transfer from denominational schools and state university diplomas are awarded
on the basis of their inclusion in the requirements for gradua27
tion.
'Moore v Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W 475 (1884), holding
that the reading of the Bible or any incidental religious service by
virtue of Code authority is not in violation of such a constitutional
prohibition. The test proposed is whether an additional burden is
placed on the taxpayer because of these activities. Accord: That the
mere saying of prayers does not convert the school into a place of
worship, Hackett v. School District, 120 Ky 608, 87 S.W 792 (1905).
But compare State ex rel. Weiss v District Board, 76 Wis. 177,
44 N.W 967 (1890), holding that mere use of the Bible as a textbook
is in contravention of such a statutory provision.
' McCollum v Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211, 212, 68
Sup. Ct. 461, 465, 92 L.Ed. 451, 456 (1948), Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 513,
91 L.Ed. 711, 724-725 (1947)
' See note 7 supra.
' See, JOHNSON and YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES, c. 6 (1948).
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When the possible implications of the decision, as outlined
above, are considered, plus imiumerable others that have not
been discussed, it may well be questioned whether even those
religious groups which have most fervently espoused the-cause
of complete Church-State separation would tolerate the completeness of the separation which may be indicated by this decision. No one will seriously question the advisability of preventing religious sects from engaging in their doctrinal feuds through
the media of public schools. This prompts the conclusion that
the principal case, confined to its facts, may well be unassailable.
What will be questioned is the advisability, without regard to the
intent of the Constitution, of disrupting or interfering with the
teaching and inculcation of moral and spiritual principles by
the public school. It is believed that the unnecessarily broad
language used in the decision jeopardizes this fundamental function of our educational system. It has been suggested, 2 s and it is
reiterated here, that traditionally such teaching has and must
be based on religious concepts. In view of such a background it
is inconceivable that the First Amendment was intended to exclude such teachings. Already there are definite indications that
unfavorable local administrative decisions based on the principal
case will not only be ignored but will be fought through the
courts. This is illustrative of the simple fact that no court can
by a single decision completely divorce such fundamental prmnciples from our traditional way of life.
JAmEs
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Stout, The Establishment of Religion Under the Constitution,
37 Ky. L.J. 220 (1948).

